Abstract Disasters are no longer viewed as natural events, but as the results of illplanned development and poor governance. It has been generally accepted that instruments such as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reduce disaster risks of development projects. This study evaluates the effectiveness of the EIA process in addressing disaster risks in development projects in Sri Lanka and New Zealand, two countries with quite different quality of governance. We find that governance quality does not result in substantive improvements, and neither of the two EIA processes is found to be effective in addressing disaster risk. This is due to inadequate policy integration of disaster risk into the environmental legislation that governs the EIA process. The results suggest that more specificity is needed in legislative provisions.
Introduction
Many economic development interventions have inadvertently created new forms of hazards and vulnerabilities, especially in low-and middle-income countries, which also often have poor governance records (UNISDR 2011). Development control instruments such as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Social Impact Assessment (SIA), Human Health Risk Assessment (HHRA), Risk Assessment (RA), Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and Sustainability Assessment (SA) (Zhang et al. 2010 ) are used to assess and mitigate adverse environmental effects of development activities. Among these different tools, the oldest and most well established is Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (IAIA (International Association for Impact Assessment) 2009), which is practiced in over 100 countries, including most low-and middle-income countries (Alshuwaikhat 2005) . Evaluating probable risks created by development activities and factoring those risk considerations into planning and investment decisions are widely discussed in the literature (e.g. Blaikie et al. 1994; Schipper and Pelling 2006) , but current knowledge and understanding on the integration of disaster risk into the EIA process are limited. In this study, disaster risk is defined as a compound function of the natural hazards and the degree of vulnerability to those hazards (Blaikie et al. 1994) .
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), national disaster management authorities and independent researchers suggest that the EIA process is a tool to address development-induced disaster risks (e.g. Benson and Twigg 2007; UNISDR 2014) . The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) requires that disaster risk is taken into account in the EIA process (UNISDR 2014). Seventy-two countries, out of 111 countries that met the HFA progress reporting obligations in the 2009-2011 reporting cycle, reported using EIA as a mechanism to address disaster risks of development projects. 1 However, claims that EIA processes effectively address disaster risks have yet to be demonstrated with empirical evidence. This research sought primarily to provide an empirical analysis of the effectiveness of EIA processes in addressing the disaster risk of development projects in two countries that are recorded by UNISDR as having EIA processes. Kakonge (1998) argues that well-conceived EIA processes should reflect many of the elements of 'good' governance principles including transparency, sufficient information flows, accountability, responsibility and stakeholder participation. Quality of governance, therefore, is considered as having a direct bearing on the effectiveness of impact assessments. Our secondary research goal was to assess the effect of quality of governance on the effectiveness of EIA processes. In this research, the effectiveness of the EIA process in addressing development-induced disasters in two countries with different governance quality is evaluated by comparing the EIA processes of Sri Lanka and New Zealand. New Zealand consistently shows a high level of governance quality in the governance indicators of the World Bank, while Sri Lanka lags behind in all governance indicators (The World Bank Group 2013).
Assessing the effectiveness of EIA processes
Performance evaluation of EIA is considered 'one of the most difficult to conceptualize and least explored empirically' (Wang et al. 2012, p. 413) . Many have argued that assessing effectiveness of impact assessment tools, especially EIA, is problematic since it is unlikely that a control is available against which to compare the implementation of the tool, and it is also not possible to judge likely impacts in the absence of the tool (e.g. Cashmore et al. 2004; Retief et al. 2008) . Wang et al. (2012) identify two main challenges: identification and formulation of indicators and quantification and measuring conformance to the indicators. However, Wood (1995) has argued that there is no reliable quantification approach, and the effectiveness of EIA processes must be based on the attitudes and opinions of those directly involved with the specific EIA system.
Performance evaluations have mostly investigated procedural requirements of EIA (Jay et al. 2007 ). Sadler (1996, p. 39) defines procedural effectiveness as whether the EIA conforms to 'established provisions and principles'. For example, how an EIA process works from a procedural perspective is the extent to which it meets accepted principles such as clearly defined objectives, provision of support and guidance, application to socioeconomic effects and provision for monitoring (Wang et al. 2012) . However, increasing attention is being placed upon evaluating EIA according to more substantive criteria, which investigate the outcome of the EIA process (Jay et al. 2007) . One of the core questions of evaluation studies has been whether the impact assessment instrument meets the purpose for which it is designed (Wang et al. 2012 ). This aspect of performance evaluation is called substantive effectiveness, and Sadler (1996, p. 39 ) describes it as, whether '…the EA [EIA] process achieve[s] the objectives set'. Sadler (1996, p. 229) argues that 'emerging policy and institutional realities and broad societal changes' are changing the context in which EIA is operated. This idea of contextual influence has been further scrutinised by scholars such as Bina et al. (2011) and Runhaar and Drissen (2007) . According to Bina (2008, p. 719) , 'the persistent failure of planning and decision-making to deliver environmentally sustainable development is closely linked to the limited environmental governance capacity of the machinery of government'. Different scholars have considered different contextual dimensions in building their argument about the importance of contextual effectiveness in EIA performance evaluations (Boyle 1998; Marara et al. 2011; Nykvist and Nilsson 2009) . It is impractical to consider all the different dimensions in a single study; therefore, we have chosen 'policy and political context' and the 'quality of governance' as the key variables to explore in the cases of Sri Lanka and New Zealand.
Finally, the 'level of policy integration' of disaster risk has not been evaluated as an 'effectiveness' dimension. Therefore, it is important to clearly identify the range of effectiveness dimensions that are investigated when doing effectiveness research. Given the possible importance of policy integration of disaster risk and contextual matters, such as the quality of governance in decisions on developments and their potential consequences on the environment, this study investigates policy integration and 'contextual', 'procedural' and 'substantive' effectiveness of EIA.
Research methodology
Research on evaluation of effectiveness of different impact assessment tools (e.g. EIA, risk assessment, strategic environmental assessment, social impact assessment) and agency documents (e.g. the Caribbean Development Bank, UNISDR) on disaster risk reduction and environmental management was reviewed. Data for the research were gathered from interviews using a semi-structured questionnaire and focus group discussions (FGDs) with respondents selected on the basis of their role, knowledge and expertise on the EIA process in the two countries. Documents from both state and non-state actors relevant to the EIA process were also analysed. Several recently conducted development projects in each country were used as cases to understand how the EIA legislation is used in practice.
Identification and formulation of evaluation criteria
'Level of policy integration' of disaster risks was used as the first effectiveness dimension in this research. Under this dimension, whether disaster risk reduction is an integral part of the EIA process was evaluated. In reviewing the literature, it is clear that the criteria for each effectiveness dimension can be further grouped into clusters. Under procedural effectiveness, two criteria clusters were assessed (i.e. legal basis and guidance). Five evaluation criteria were explored under 'legal basis', covering 'clarity' and 'comprehensiveness' of legislative provisions, explicit 'requirements' to cover disaster risks in the EIA process and 'provisions for legally challenging' decision outputs. The guidance cluster included 'guidance on public reviewing', 'incorporation of hazard assessment and vulnerability assessment in terms of reference for EIA reports' and 'compliance monitoring'.
In some literature, including Sadler (1996) , 'the level of assessment' is considered as a procedural dimension. However, in this research, the level of disaster risk assessment in the EIA process was evaluated as an aspect that directly affects the substantive effectiveness of EIA to address disaster risks and therefore considered under the substantive dimension. Many scholars have measured substantive effectiveness in terms of the influence of EIA on well-informed decision-making (e.g. van Doren et al. 2013 ). This research followed a similar approach and investigated the influence of EIA on decision-making and project planning.
According to Hilding-Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir (2007, p. 674) , 'the elements of context are ''context'' dependent' and should be decided based on the context of the research. Six criteria clusters were used under contextual effectiveness: public participation, policy context, transparency and accountability, political will, coordination and funding conditions. Public participation in EIA report reviewing is also a procedural requirement in many EIA systems. However, consultation and public participation in general are largely determined by the level of governance quality existing in a particular country. Under the policy context, the influence of disaster management and development planning legislation in addressing disaster risks of development projects was assessed. Many scholars have identified lack of transparency and accountability of agencies, lack of political support and poor coordination among agencies as key factors that contribute to poor effectiveness of EIA processes (Bina et al. 2011; Marara et al. 2011) . Therefore, criteria relevant to accountability and transparency, political will and coordination among agencies were also selected.
Finally, it is the general perception that multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the ADB promote environmental planning when development aids and loans are dispersed, and these agencies also have significant negotiation power over the recipient countries (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Ortolano and Shepherd 1995; Shandra et al. 2011) . Therefore, the influence of funding conditions was considered here as an evaluation criterion. Wang et al. (2012) used 13 indicators in their study, while Wood (1995) used 14 criteria. Wood's 14 criteria have later been applied by a number of scholars in many different contexts (e.g. Nadeem and Hameed 2008; Panigrahi and Amirapu 2012; Zubair 2001) . Sadler (1996) used 31 criteria, and Ahmad and Wood (2002) have adopted 24 criteria including four criteria proposed by Fuller (1999) . The practicality of operationalising the evaluation criteria in qualitative interviews and the number of criteria required to investigate performance of the EIA process were considered in deciding the number of criteria used in this study. Ultimately 22 evaluation criteria were selected under the four effectiveness dimensions discussed above. These 22 criteria are listed in Table 3 along with the summary of findings. Most evaluation criteria used in this research were derived from the available literature on effectiveness research; however, eight criteria specifically relevant to disaster risks (i.e. criteria 1, 5, 8, 10, 11, 16, 21 and 22) were developed for this research, as there is little literature available on addressing these aspects in EIA processes.
Selection of projects
Two recently conducted major development projects from Sri Lanka and two projects from New Zealand were analysed against the criteria in Table 3 . Selection of these projects was based on the scale of the development activity, potential to create disaster risk, number of people directly and indirectly affected, accessibility of project information and similarity for comparability between countries. The projects chosen were a hydropower dam and a transport project in each of Sri Lanka and New Zealand that were to be constructed in locations exposed to known hazardous events of landslides, earthquakes and flooding (including flooding caused by dam breaks and displacement resulting from landslides or earthquakes) ( Table 1 ).
Data collection and analysis
Respondents for the qualitative interviews in both countries were chosen using purposive sampling that reflected the exploratory nature of the research and the limited number of regulatory decision-makers involved in each project. Interviewees were in three main categories: planners, EIA experts and community members ( Table 2) .
Planners and experts were selected based on their role in the EIA process and project planning. As the number, limited content and availability of submissions and other documents in Sri Lanka were very limited, and some of the government employees involved in the processes were exceptionally reticent in commenting on some aspects (e.g. political influence), visits to potentially affected communities were also undertaken (without officials present) to gain further insight and data on the EIA processes. In New Zealand, the number, detailed content and accessibility of submissions (including the affected communities) and other documents were extensive, and all those interviewed were very open and consistent in response to questions about political influence on the EIA process. Consequently, no attempt was made to gain further information directly from the affected New Zealand communities. Instead, documents from the EIA processes for a further five projects were examined to ascertain that the contents of the submissions and processes employed had a similar degree of consistency of approach. This examination confirmed the findings on the primary two projects, but as they do not add any substantive new insights, for the sake of simplicity only the two primary projects are reported here. In Sri Lanka, in addition to the interviews with planners and experts, as noted above, visits were made to the areas affected by the two projects, and focus group discussions (FGDs) and in-depth interviews were conducted with community members. Altogether, 38 in-depth interviews were conducted in the two countries. In addition, 22 participants were involved in six FGDs in Sri Lanka. Community members for in-depth interviews were identified during FGDs using recommendations from the participants. A minimum of two FGDs were conducted in each location in order to avoid a single line of inquiry. Data from the interviews and focus group discussions were triangulated against data gathered from agency documents, journal articles, newspaper articles and reports from advocacy groups, and EIA reports. A 5-level Likert scale of performance (i.e. fully, mostly, reasonable, limited, no) was used to measure criteria conformance.
Environmental and disaster management contexts
In Sri Lanka, the National Environmental Act (NEA) 1980 recommended the adoption of EIA. However, EIA under the NEA was only fully introduced after the National Environmental (Amendment) Act (NEAA) No. 56 of 1988 was enacted. Under the NEAA 1988, the Central Environmental Authority (CEA) has been made responsible to coordinate the implementation of EIA and approval of the projects with the relevant Project Approval Agencies (PAA). Twenty-three different government agencies were named as PAA. Zubair (Bührs and Bartlett 1993; Memon and Perkins 2000) . New Zealand's local government reforms also occurred in tandem with resource management reforms resulting in a three-tiered strategy for governance: central government, regional and district councils (Ericksen et al. 2003) . Every application for a resource consent is required to provide an assessment of effects on the environment. Consents are only granted if those meet the purpose of the Act, which includes considering the health and safety of people. Consents are also assessed against rules in district and regional plans. These plans are required to address hazard risks, but a recent survey indicates that there is limited consideration of such matters in plans (Saunders et al. 2014 ).
EIA performances in addressing disaster risk
This section presents a comparison of key findings from the two countries in relation to the key effectiveness dimensions listed in Table 3 . The EIA procedures in each country are summarised in Figs. 1 and 2.
Policy integration
In Sri Lanka, the NEA 1980 does not include people as a part of the environment; therefore, the Act does not technically address the impacts on people. However, the interviews with planners and experts and the analysis of the EIA reports revealed that EIAs in practice do include sections on social and economic impacts. The Act requires the EIA report to provide 'a description of the avoidable and unavoidable adverse environmental effect of the proposed prescribed project' [NEAA 1988, s. 12(b) ]. According to the CEA planner, disaster risks are implicit in this phrase. However, most experts argued for explicit reference to disaster risks in the legislation.
In contrast, in New Zealand, the RMA 1991 covers people and communities as a part of the environment, so technically the Act is in a position to address disaster risk. There are other provisions in the RMA 1991 where hazard risk is both implicitly and explicitly mentioned, namely ss.3, 30, 31, 106 and Schedule 4. Under s.3 of the RMA 1991, any potential effect of high probability and any potential effect of low probability, which has a high potential impact, should be included as a part of the assessment of effects. Some planners argued that the above provisions are an implicit reference to disaster risk and clause 2 (f) of Schedule 4 specifically requires 'any risk to the neighbourhood, the wider community, or the environment through natural hazards…' to be addressed by an EIA. Although only one of the interviewees, a social scientist, argued that the above provisions 'are [about] physical hazards', not disaster risk. Most experts argued for more explicit reference to disaster risks. There was clearly a sense that more explicit wording would result in greater attention to gathering relevant information on risks even if this did not Criteria findings were rated on a 1-5 scale, where 'fully' is highest level (5) and 'no' is the lowest (1). 'Mostly' is above average, 'reasonably' is average and 'limited' is below average Nat Hazards (2016) 81:423-445 431 change the overall weight given to such decision criteria. Project EIA reports studied also have detailed sections on hazard risk, but do not cover disaster risks. In effect, 'risk' under the RMA is seen more as the probability of occurrence of a particular event, and the assessment of the consequences is limited to the direct impacts, leaving indirect impacts, that are important in vulnerability assessment, out of the analysis.
Procedural effectiveness
The effectiveness of the EIA process in addressing disaster risk is directly related to how well different phases of the EIA process are designed and implemented. Even though most experts and planners interviewed described the EIA processes of both countries as sufficiently backed with clear and well-defined legislation, others have identified gaps. In general, the criteria for procedural effectiveness are mostly met in the New Zealand EIA process, and lack of clarity in Schedule 4 is the only major weakness in the legislation highlighted in the interviews with planners and experts. In contrast, the criteria most relevant to procedural effectiveness are either not met or met only to a limited extent in the Sri Lankan EIA process (Table 3) . New Zealand has a dual approach for resource management, where policy statements and plans dictate the resource use conditions, and the EIA process provides a check against the defined standards and rules. This enables local authorities to dictate terms on resource use limits in a particular area, and all development activities other than prohibited and permitted activities require an EIA before approval is given. Thus, local differences can be easily incorporated into project screening, and any significant development activity is subjected to environmental scrutiny. In Sri Lanka, only the projects prescribed by the NER 1993 and its later amendment undergo an EIA. This list is not exhaustive, and some activities, for example, the expansion of existing roads that potentially increase disaster risks, are not included in this list. Similarly, local differences are not captured in project screening as a national list is unable to provide details on all specific development activities.
In New Zealand, explicit reference to hazard (but not disaster) risk in Schedule 4 of the RMA has led to consideration of hazard risk in the scope of the EIA and also to incorporate a dedicated section or chapter in the EIA report for hazard risk, whereas in Sri Lanka, lack of such explicit reference to either hazard or disaster risk in the legislation or in the ToR has resulted in weaker attention to disaster risk in the EIA report.
Both countries have provisions for public reviewing of EIA reports. However, in Sri Lanka despite legislative requirements for public participation in all EIA (but not IEEs), practice is considered weak, as sufficient measures are not taken to make it effective. In New Zealand, only publicly notified applications are required to be made available for public review and comment. The decision on public notification is usually made by local authority staff and can only be challenged in the High Court on points of law, which, according to a commissioner, is a drawback of the legislation. Some aspects of the process (including the time for public submissions) have specified maximum timeframes within which certain steps must be completed. In the case of a project requiring a full EIA (Sri Lanka) or public notification (New Zealand), the specified maximum time frames from submission of application until a non-appealed decision add to 110 days (Sri Lanka) and 95 days (New Zealand) (Figs. 1, 2) . However, this does not allow for various non-timebound steps such as the length of time of public hearings. Notably, the period available for public submissions in Sri Lanka is 30 days, whereas it is only 20 days in New Zealand.
In Sri Lanka, the Project Approval Authority issues a ToR for the EIA. Even though the PAA is required to summon a scoping committee for this purpose, all planners and experts said that the current mechanism is ineffective due to lack of project information at the early stages of the EIA process. A general ToR is issued for every project despite their nature and magnitude. In contrast, the scope of the EIA is a responsibility of the developer in New Zealand although it must include comment on all relevant items identified in Schedule 4 of the RMA. Therefore, the developer largely dictates terms of reference for the EIA. The scope of an EIA neither requires the consent from a respective local authority nor is it subjected to an independent or public review before the full assessment is started. As reported earlier, Schedule 4 requires investigating hazard risk, but not disaster risk. According to the social scientists interviewed, such weak guidance together with the influence of developers in the scoping process often leads to neglecting social impacts in the EIA reports.
An assessment of alternative locations and methods for the proposed development project is weak in both countries. In Sri Lanka, according to the NEAA 1988, an EIA report should also provide 'a description of alternatives to the activity [proposed project] which might be less harmful to the environment together with the reasons why such alternatives were rejected' [NEAA 1988, s. 12 (b) ]. However, all experts argue that the above requirement is not adequately addressed in the current EIA practice, and the information provided in the EIA reports on project alternatives is misleading. In New Zealand, under Schedule 4 of the RMA, 'a description of any possible alternative locations or methods for undertaking the activity' is required in the EIA report if the proposed activity 'is likely [to]…result in any significant adverse effect on the environment'. According to the Ministry for the Environment (MfE) (2006, p. 24) , it is important to 'consider alternatives in the widest possible way' only if the proposal is likely to cause significant adverse effects. However, it is evident that in all project EIA reports reviewed, the alternative options have not been considered adequately. For instance, the Engineering Report for the WIHS (Rivett et al. 2012 ) provides alternative dam locations, but does not provide details on alternative methods (e.g. wind energy) for the proposed activity (electricity generation).
In Sri Lanka, there is neither a legal requirement nor a standard practice to incorporate a separate section in the EIA reports on disaster risk. The legal expert and the CEA planner argued that any attempt to separate disaster-related impacts into a separate chapter would lead to confusion over classification of environmental impacts as disasters and non-disasters. However, the disaster management expert and the EIA experts supported having a separate chapter on disaster risk, saying incorporation of a chapter on disaster risk provides better chances to identify project-induced disaster risks even if it is a repetition of facts in the EIA report. In all seven EIA reports reviewed from New Zealand, a section or a chapter has been allocated to hazard risk. In addition, a separate analysis has been conducted of a potential break in all three dam projects studied as per the requirements of the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2008. All these studies are highly hazard risk oriented, and the potential disaster risk has not been estimated in detail.
Both countries have provisions to appeal against a decision made by the Project Approval Agency or consent authority. However, in Sri Lanka, the public does not have an equal right to appeal against an approval decision. According to the legal expert, a member of the public can apply to the Supreme Court under the fundamental rights given in the Constitution if he/she wants to challenge a decision, which is an expensive process, unaffordable to many. It is clear that environmental groups most often fund such public grievances to the courts.
In Sri Lanka, interviews with experts, planners and community members showed that the current mechanism for compliance monitoring is weak and ineffective. Even though the prime responsibility for compliance monitoring lies with the CEA, lack of guidance on compliance monitoring and unavailability of standards against which the monitoring should take place have affected the overall compliance monitoring efforts. In addition, the experts interviewed also argued that the lack of interest and motivation of the CEA are reasons for current weaknesses in compliance monitoring. It is also clear that lack of provisions for public participation in project monitoring, including unavailability of approval conditions, also hinders compliance monitoring efforts. In New Zealand, as per s.35 of the RMA, the responsibility of monitoring is given to the local authority level. However, Schedule 4 of the RMA is not clear and explicit about the responsibility of monitoring between the consent authority and the applicant. According to the local council planners interviewed, in practice both the local authority and the developers take responsibility. Provisions in the RMA enable any member of the public to apply to the Environment Court for an order to enforce a consent condition or to abate an adverse effect that is not covered by conditions. It is also clear that having project approval, including conditions readily available in the public domain, makes the developers obliged to implement conditions, monitor and take actions on project impacts to safeguard their longterm financial interests.
Substantive effectiveness
Project screening in both Sri Lanka and New Zealand is not effective in terms of considering development-induced disaster risk. In Sri Lanka, screening of proposals takes place at two different stages. Firstly, project proposals are screened based on the prescribed project list provided in the NER 1993. Three different aspects are considered in this process: the scale of the proposed activity; nature of the activity; and nature of the receiving environment. Choosing between EIA and IEE is an opaque process and is left to the discretion of the appointed PAA. This is done during the scoping process. According to the CEA planner, EIA is an in-depth assessment, compared to IEE, and also requires public review. Out of the three aspects that should be considered in screening, scale of the project can easily be manipulated, and all experts interviewed argued that developers commonly downplay the scale of projects to bypass an in-depth environmental and public scrutiny.
In New Zealand, the screening process is very clear in the legislation. Screening is done against the different classes of activities listed in relevant district and regional plans (i.e. permitted, controlled, restricted discretionary, discretionary, non-complying and prohibited). However, most experts interviewed argued that the above classification in regional and district plans is often not based on a full and explicit risk assessment. In addition, the projects studied showed that there is an inconsistency in how disaster risk is assessed and treated in the EIA processes due to lack of explicit references to disaster risk in environmental management legislation in both Sri Lanka and New Zealand. While hazard assessment in Sri Lanka is weak and falling short in terms of its depth and breadth, in New Zealand it is more detailed. However, neither country has vulnerability assessments conducted even in their simplest forms. Moreover, social impacts are given little attention in both countries, and such assessments do not have clear and explicit links to hazard assessment conducted in the same EIA report. It is clear that the hazard assessors and social impact assessors should work closely to estimate disaster risk of development projects. According to the experts in both countries, there is a tendency that coordination among technical teams is weak in project EIAs. In New Zealand, execution of SIAs is not consistent in practice. For instance, out of seven projects reviewed, explicit SIAs have been done for only four projects. As an example, the EIA for the WIHS, which is considered a project that potentially increases vulnerability of many downstream communities, does not include a SIA. In New Zealand, the level of influence of EIA findings on project approval varies, based on the provisions in relevant policies and plans. According to the two environmental commissioners interviewed, the EIA report has little influence on approval decisions compared to plans and policies. This has a number of negative implications on the substantive effectiveness of the EIA process. It is clear that currently the plans are not based on explicit risk-based assessment, and compared to plans, findings of the EIA processes have more up-to-date information. Therefore, the lower emphasis given to the EIA processes in the project approval process reduces the effectiveness of the entire process. This finding lends support to research that has emphasised the importance of SEA for plans and policies. In this regard, although exploring its effectiveness was not part of this research, we note that Sect. 32 of the RMA provides SEA provisions. These provisions, however, do not explicitly include hazard or disaster risk assessment.
Nevertheless, there is a clear difference between Sri Lanka and New Zealand on how the EIA processes influence project planning. In Sri Lanka, EIA findings are often not considered in project planning, while in New Zealand there is a high tendency that EIA findings are used in project planning. There is clear empirical evidence that the two projects researched in Sri Lanka have already increased disaster risks in the environment, proving that the EIA processes in these two projects were ineffective in reducing disaster risks. Similarly, in New Zealand, the EIA reports of the seven studied projects have not assessed disaster risks adequately. In the WIHS, community members have already raised their concerns about increased disaster risk in their submissions to the regional council. Even though the real implications of such inadequate assessments will only be realised in the future when the project impacts are actually felt, experiences from other poorly planned infrastructure projects around the world suggest that such impacts will be significant and should be considered in the approval process.
Contextual effectiveness
According to the experts interviewed, public reviewing of the EIA report is often the only opportunity for public participation in the Sri Lankan EIA process. Even though the NER 1993 recommends that the PAA may consult the public in developing the ToR for an EIA report, both experts and planners interviewed stated that public participation during scoping is absent in practice. According to the experts, the public is not adequately consulted in the EIA process, and the community members interviewed stated that developers attempt to inform and educate the public about project benefits, rather than listening to their concerns. Public participation in impact identification and compliance monitoring is absent both in the legislation and in practice. In New Zealand, as per the RMA 1991, there is no statutory requirement for an applicant to consult the public or affected parties before an application is lodged for resource consent. However, both MfE (1999) and case law promote consultation at early stages of the EIA process largely on the basis that it would be hard to accurately assess the effects of an activity without such consultation. There is no legal requirement for public consultation during impact identification for non-notified applications and compliance monitoring, unless public participation for the latter is required as a condition of the approval. All notified applications, however, provide opportunities for public participation.
In Sri Lanka, the influence of public comments in the EIA process is unclear. According to most experts interviewed, lack of transparency of the EIA process makes it less clear whether the project proponent considers public comments and alters the original project plans accordingly. However, in New Zealand, all planners and experts interviewed agreed that public submissions are considered in decision-making. However, one commissioner argued that even if there is public opposition, projects could still be approved if the relevant policy or plan allows an activity with that effect.
The development planning process in Sri Lanka is also controlled by other legislation, and over 40 acts, bills and ordinances hold provisions directly or indirectly related to hazard management in Sri Lanka (Practical Action, unpublished data). Even though it is not explicitly required under the NEA 1980, it is clear from the interview with the CEA planner and EIA experts that provisions of other legislation are considered in decisionmaking. In this study, the influence of the LGOIMA) all have provisions related to natural hazard management. Although only the RMA has any direct or explicit provisions related to the EIA process, all but CDEMA have paid attention to natural hazard risk in development planning. The Building Act in particular has provisions to enforce a dam safety assurance programme for medium and high potential impact dams, which includes among others safety reviews of the dam, a monitoring plan and also an emergency action plan. In addition to the Building Act, the CDEMA is the main piece of legislation on hazard management, which primarily provides an emergency management framework for New Zealand. Most planners and experts raised their concern about a lack of coherence between the CDEMA and the RMA. For instance, according to the National Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Strategy, risk reduction is expected to be handled through local RMA plans and other instruments at the national level. However, there are no clear visible links between the CDEMA and the RMA to perform the above requirements. In Sri Lanka, the relevant PAA appoints a Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) to assist the PAA in the approval process. The TEC is a multidisciplinary team and is assigned to assess the EIA report, public comments and the responses of the project proponent to the public comments and provide recommendations to the PAA on project approval. Most experts and planners interviewed believed that the TEC is a decisive structure in the Sri Lankan EIA process. However, the two EIA experts criticised the poor transparency of the TEC process and commitment and technical expertise of TECs appointed for some projects, whereas in New Zealand, under the RMA, it is a standard practice for a consent authority official or a commissioned consultant to prepare a report before a decision on an application is made. The context of that report is not specified, but as it is intended to assist with decision-making, it usually involves assessing and where satisfied adopting the EIA report. Where the application has been notified, this report will usually draw on comments from submitters in its evaluation of the EIA reports. Provisions are also available to commission an expert report on aspects of the proposal or EIA report if the application has potentially significant adverse environmental effects, and from the consent authority's view, the information provided by the applicant is not satisfactory to understand the full extent of the effects. However, because the cost of the report is borne by the applicant, the consent of the applicant is required to commission such a report. If done, this process yields an independent report that evaluates the specific findings of the EIA report. According to most experts and planners, EIA findings of publicly notified applications are also subjected to technical verification through independent experts during public hearing processes.
According to the NEAA 1988 in Sri Lanka, PAA should publish the approval in the Gazette and in newspapers in local languages. However, the conditions attached to the approval are neither legally required to be made public nor being done in practice. In New Zealand, provisions in the RMA, the LGA and the LGOIMA together ensure that the information on resource consents, decisions and conditions is made available for the public as of right.
In Sri Lanka, it appears that the EIA process is often subjected to political interference thus putting its effectiveness at risk. According to the experts interviewed, the importance of the EIA process on project approval is often denied by the political authority. The experts argued that the EIA process is given lesser weight, and sometimes even bypassed when politically motivated projects are proposed. The planners from state agencies refrained from answering any questions related to 'political will' in the EIA process. In New Zealand, according to the experts, even though political pressure can be seen on some development activities, political influence does not affect the decisions on resource consents. The experts and planners claimed that this is due to open governance, respect for the rule of law and opportunities available in the EIA process to contest and appeal against decisions. Experts further believed that having the Environment Court in the process is a major advantage to make the EIA a more transparent and accountable process.
Lack of coordination and cooperation among development planning agencies in Sri Lanka was evident during the interviews with the planners of different agencies. It was noted that the DMC is currently not involved in the EIA process and is promoting a separate disaster impact assessment system (as recommended in the National Disaster Management Strategy) for development-induced disaster risk. It was clear that the planners of different agencies are putting the blame on each other for lack of support in addressing disaster risks of development projects. In New Zealand, inter-agency coordination is explicitly required among relevant agencies under the RMA. However, according to an EIA expert, coordination is weak due to the compartmentalised nature of these organisations. For example, all experts and planners argued that the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) is currently not involved in the resource consent process. According to one local council planner '…the MCDEM could be more involved in the EIA process'.
Sri Lanka is heavily dependent on foreign development aid for infrastructure development. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) all play a significant role in the country's development, and these three agencies combined held approximately 45 % of lending to the country in 2012 (The Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) 2012). All three agencies require an EIA for any significant development projects they fund. This influence has brought noteworthy benefits in terms of disaster risk reduction in Sri Lanka. For example, expansion of existing roads, which is not required to undergo environmental scrutiny under the NER 1993, required an EIA under the conditions set out by the above funders. In the latest country partnership strategies issued for the 2012-2016 funding cycle for Sri Lanka, both the ADB and the World Bank emphasise not only environmentally friendly development, but also the importance of integrating disaster and climate risk into the development planning processes.
However, the influx of Chinese funding to the country has increased by almost 95 % from 2008 to 2012 (CBSL 2008 (CBSL , 2012 . In 2012, 46 % of all foreign borrowing came from two Chinese banks (CBSL 2012) . Interviewees noted that these banks do not require environmental assessment as a condition of funding. It is evident from the interviews with the planners and the experts that the influence of Chinese funding is two-pronged. Firstly, it has taken away the positive influence traditionally had on the EIA process by other multilateral agencies. Secondly, the projects funded by Chinese loans are also politically influenced and thus are not usually subjected to environmental assessment through the standard Sri Lankan EIA system. Therefore, it is clear that the increased role played by bilateral aid, especially from China, is having substantial negative effects on the EIA process of Sri Lanka.
In contrast, development projects in New Zealand are based on either private investments or loans negotiated by the government, and the control of the implementation of the project is governed under the domestic legal framework. Therefore, conditions of development funding have little or no influence on New Zealand's environmental management efforts.
Discussion
EIA is a key tool in development planning, and many scholars have explicitly discussed the integration of disaster risk reduction (DRR) in development planning (Blaikie et al. 1994; Schipper and Pelling 2006; Wamsler 2004 Wamsler , 2006 . Wamsler (2006) , in particular, emphasises the importance of compliance with EIA legislation in order to address disaster risks. Despite the origins of EIA as being assessing the effects on the environment of development projects, the international acceptance of its role in reducing the risk of disasters is now evident in the UNISDR's progress reporting framework for the Hyogo Framework Agreement (HFA). The reporting framework requires member countries to assess themselves against a set of criteria that ostensibly indicate that the country is implementing necessary steps in reducing the risk of disaster. Core indicator 6 of priority for action 4 of the HFA 'Impacts of disaster risk taken account in Environment Impact Assessment (EIA)' (UNISDR 2014, p. 30) was reported to have been met by more than 72 countries, including New Zealand and Sri Lanka, in the 2009-2011 reporting cycle (PreventionWeb 2014). The integration of EIA with the reduction in risks of disasters is therefore generally accepted.
However, as the results report here have indicated, there are significant differences in the effectiveness of EIA in addressing potentially increased disaster risks that result from development projects examined in the two countries. If, as Kakonge (1998) has argued, EIA processes should reflect good governance elements such as transparency, sufficient information, accountability, responsibility and stakeholder participation, then it could be expected that the presence or absence of these elements, their relative strength or weakness would affect the quality of outcomes of EIA processes. On almost all effectiveness criteria (Table 3) , the New Zealand system is better performed, and it seems reasonable to conclude that this is due in part to the higher level of governance quality in accord with New Zealand. The good governance criteria are strongly supported in law, and according to the interviews this is supported in practice, whereas in Sri Lanka the levels of discretion (particularly in screening), lack of transparency and processes for informing and gathering information render the process more opaque.
The relatively short period for making submissions in New Zealand, compared with the longer phase for public review in Sri Lanka (which Zubair (2001) has already criticised as too short), might suggest that the Sri Lankan system provides greater scope for public participation, but this has to be seen in the wider context of the New Zealand planning process that drives the screening of projects. Policy statements and plans dictate the resource use conditions in New Zealand, and the EIA process provides a check against the set standards and rules. The policies and plans are developed with significant public involvement and participation (Perkins and Thorns 2001) and have provisions for appeals to courts that are well exercised. Thus, the public's views and values are usually included in plans. Such an approach enables local authorities to dictate the terms of resource use limitation in a particular area on a base that has already been through processes built on good governance principles. This contrasts with the Sri Lankan planning system which has progressed little since Zubair (2001) identified it as an area needing improvement if EIA processes were to work better.
Indeed, many of Zubair's (2001) criticisms of the weaknesses of Sri Lanka's EIA in addressing environmental concerns are also present in its weaknesses in addressing disaster risks (e.g. public participation, the inadequacies of the project lists and ToR, poor professional practice and lack of relevant data). However, there appears to be a deeper issue of simple failure to integrate approaches to disaster. Morgan (2012, p. 9 ) argues that problems with procedural effectiveness persist generally, and '…there is every reason to expect this [practice issue] to continue and grow as new challenges come from new areas of application and new forms of impact assessment'. Using EIA to address DRR is a new area of application, and it is understandable if it has not been well integrated into practice in both countries. The term 'hazard' is commonly used, often interchangeably, with disasters in both Sri Lanka and New Zealand, but neither the term 'vulnerability' nor 'vulnerability assessment' has the same level of recognition. This lack of understanding and weak attention to the condition of vulnerability, in turn, affects how disaster risk is treated in both countries. New Zealand's inclusion of hazard risk in the RMA in 1991 may also have fallen short of considering vulnerability due in part to the focus at the time on environmental bottom lines (Upton et al. 2002) and the general reluctance in a neoliberal society to consider more social risks, such as vulnerability. This is reflected in the relatively limited attention given to Social Impact Assessment in the New Zealand projects. The lack of vulnerability assessment in the development of New Zealand's plans and policies (Saunders et al. 2014 ) may also reflect this general neoliberal approach.
Coupled with the fact that neither country has a stand-alone disaster management agency that as standard practice incorporates and advocates for the inclusion of EIA in all risk assessments, it seems apparent that EIA is still largely conceptualised as being about direct and indirect, high probability biophysical environmental impacts of projects on primarily biophysical elements of the world. The indirect, lower probability, but high impacts of consequentially disastrous events are simply outside the perspectives of those implementing the legislation. Unless the legislation specifically requires vulnerability assessments, it seems apparent that neither country will use EIA in a way that substantively reduces risks of disaster. Marara et al. (2011) emphasises the importance of political will in achieving effectiveness in EIA. Even though the political influence of the government agenda towards development is common in both studied countries, how such influences materialise within the established legal framework of each country makes the difference between good and bad governance. The Sri Lankan EIA process is often subjected to political interference putting its effectiveness at risk. Such a lack of political support, according to Wood (1995) , is the biggest constraint to effective EIA in developing countries. Experts further argued that the 'true' feasibility of some projects is not being examined because decisions have already been taken to implement those projects. In New Zealand, according to the experts, even though political pressure can be seen in the promotion of some development activities, this influence does not affect decisions on resource consents. The experts and planners claimed that this is because of open governance, respect for the rule of the law and opportunities available in the EIA process to contest and appeal decisions. Experts further believed that having the Environment Court in the process is a major advantage to make the EIA a more transparent and accountable process.
Conclusions and policy implications
This study has found that the EIA processes in Sri Lanka and New Zealand are not effective in addressing disaster risks of development projects. The study further shows that inadequacy of disaster risk reduction practices, procedures and knowledge across environmental and disaster management policies, institutions and actors and weak procedural and contextual effectiveness contribute to the poor substantive effectiveness of an EIA. It also finds that the quality of governance in the country in which the EIA is implemented does not directly affect the substantive effectiveness of the EIA in addressing disaster risks of development projects. While the contextual effectiveness has a direct relationship to procedural effectiveness, the substantive effectiveness of the EIA in addressing disaster risk is directly related to the policy, institutional and cognitive integration of disaster risks.
The findings of this research suggest a challenge to the established UNISDR practice of using EIAs as the basis to address disaster risks without evaluating the effectiveness of such processes in addressing such disaster risks. It is evident from the UNISDR's HFA progress reporting that disaster management authorities around the world consider EIA as an effective tool to address disaster risk of development projects (PreventionWeb 2014). However, findings of this research revealed that EIA is not effective in addressing disaster risk of development projects in either country. Since the general steps in carrying out an EIA are more or less similar throughout the world (Saengsupavanich 2012; Toro et al. 2010) , it is logical to infer that the above experience from Sri Lanka and New Zealand may apply to many other countries that employ EIA to address disaster risk. Therefore, the results generated from the current HFA progress reporting framework of the UNISDR may be misleading as they focus on procedural effectiveness. The use of such an indicator would be more effective if countries are also required to report against substantive effectiveness of such EIA processes in addressing disaster risks.
Based on the findings of this research, trying to extend the application of EIA to address disaster risk reduction and the associated need to consider vulnerability assessment in both Sri Lanka and New Zealand creates challenges for practitioners in perceiving the affected 'environment' as more than the biophysical environmental effects, and as including the indirect, but increased vulnerability of people and communities to the consequences of high impact natural events. Overcoming these challenges requires a number of policy adjustments in the EIA guidelines, and environmental management legislation to ensure disaster risk is explicitly added to hazard risk in the legislation and EIA procedures. Vague phrases in legislation, such as 'the avoidable and unavoidable adverse environmental effect ' (NEAA 1988, 12 (b) or 'any potential effect of low probability which has a high potential impact' [RMA 1991, s.3, (f) ], do not compel planners and practitioners to address disaster risks of development projects. Therefore, such phrases should be clarified and made more explicit as to what is intended so as to reduce the potential for ambiguities and deliver effective disaster risk reduction through EIA processes.
